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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 87 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 24/06/1997 
Where it occurred: Chawni Village, 
Alikhail District, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Detection accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim's experience was not recorded. It was one month since his last revision course and 
56 days since his last leave. The ground where the accident occurred was described as 
grazing land that was "bushy with many trees". A photograph showed no trees and small 
bushes with leaves. The demining group claimed to have "found fragments" identifying the 
device as a POMZ.  
The investigators determined that the victim was in a known POMZ minefield but neglected to 
use a tripwire feeler before advancing beneath a big bush with the detector, so pulled a 
tripwire with the detector head. It was recorded that there was "No damage to equipment", but 
photographs of a damaged Schiebel detector were included in the report. 
The Sub-Commander said that the victim had used a tripwire feeler but the "heavy bushes 
and grass" stopped him finding the tripwire. He said the victim was careless to pull the wire 
with his detector head. He said that better enforcement of existing procedure would prevent 
repetition of such accidents. 
The Section Leader stated that the deminer was working properly but was careless to pull 
the tripwire with the detector head. He said such accidents could be avoided if deminers were 
not pushed to clear quickly, if the mission length was reduced from 60 to 45 days, and if 
supervisors helped deminers more. 
The victim's partner said that he was working properly but made a mistake when pulling the 
tripwire with the detector head. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was negligent and did not use a tripwire feeler. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that all Team Leaders and Section Leaders should ensure 
that deminers use tripwire feelers properly and that the site operations officer controlling the 
entire project must be warned for his poor performance – because other examples of the 
same failure to use tripwire feelers had occurred in the same command group. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 118 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: 33,214 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 










See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: "simple" injuries to forehead and chin, "superficial" 
injuries right chest and third finger left hand, minor injuries to both thighs and both legs.  
A sketch showed multiple small abrasions to both legs, the neck, the forehead and a single 
abrasion on the chest. 
The demining group reported that the victim had suffered  "simple injuries" to forehead, chin, 
right chest wall, both thighs/legs and third finger of left hand.  
A disability claim was submitted on 24th June 1997 in which his injuries were listed as: 
multiple injuries on face, chest wall, both arms and hands and both eyes. His permanent 
injury was only "mild stiffness of left hand" where 2nd metacarpal bone was fractured – which 
was assessed as a 15% disability.  




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly and his error went uncorrected.  
The failure of the detector to signal on tripwires is mentioned in other Afghan accidents, and is 
presumed in this.  
The failure to provide adequate tools must be seen as a management failing. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
It is presumed that the victim recovered enough to undertake some form of work because his 
compensation payment was very small.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible. 
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